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Abstract 
Spectrum  auctions  are  used  by  governments  to  assign  and  price  licenses  for  wireless 
communications. The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which 
many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds. I analyze the 
strengths and weaknesses of the approach with examples from US spectrum auctions. I 
then present a variation, the combinatorial clock auction, adopted by the UK and many 
other countries, which addresses many of the problems of the simultaneous ascending 
auction while building on its strengths. The combinatorial clock auction is a simple dynamic 
auction in which bidders bid on packages of lots. Most importantly, the auction allows 
alternative technologies that require the spectrum to be organized in different ways to 
compete  in  a  technology-neutral  auction.  In  addition,  the  pricing  rule  and  information 
policy are carefully tailored to mitigate gaming behavior. An activity rule based on revealed 
preference promotes price and assignment discovery throughout the clock stage of the 
auction. Truthful bidding is encouraged, which simplifies bidding and improves efficiency. 
Experimental tests and early auctions confirm the advantages of the approach. 
(JEL D44, C78, L96. Keywords: auctions, spectrum auctions, market design, package auction, 
clock auction, combinatorial auction.) 
1  Introduction 
Fred Kahn recognized the important role of market design in improving how markets work. He believed 
prices  should  be  set  in  an  open  competitive  process,  rather  than  administratively.  I  had  the  pleasure  of 
working with Fred on a project to evaluate the pricing rule in California’s electricity market. We examined 
whether the electricity market should use uniform pricing or pay-as-bid pricing (Kahn et al. 2001). In this 
tribute to Fred Kahn, I also focus on auction design, but in the communications industry. 
Spectrum auctions have been used by governments to assign and price spectrum for the last eighteen 
years. Over those years, the simultaneous ascending auction, first introduced in the US in 1994, has been the 
predominant method of auctioning spectrum. The auctions have proved far superior to the prior methods of 
beauty contests and lotteries (Cramton 1997, Milgrom 2004).  
Despite the generally positive experience with the simultaneous ascending auction, several design issues 
have surfaced. Some were addressed with minor rule changes. For example, bidders’ use of trailing digits to 
signal other bidders and support tacit collusion was eliminated by limiting bids to integer multiples of the 
minimum increment (Cramton and Schwartz 2002). However, many other design problems remain. In this 
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paper,  I  identify  these  problems,  and  describe  a  new  approach,  the  combinatorial  clock  auction,  based 
primarily  on  the  clock-proxy  auction  (Ausubel  et  al.  2006),  which  addresses  the  main  limitations  of  the 
simultaneous ascending auction. 
My focus here is on spectrum auction design, rather than spectrum policy more generally. Certainly 
communications regulators face many other critical challenges, such as how best to free up new spectrum for 
auction (Cramton et al. 1998), or whether an auction is needed at all (FCC 2002). For some allocations, it is 
better to set aside the spectrum for common property use, as is done with unlicensed spectrum. In particular, 
for applications that do not create additional scarcity, the commons model is better than the auction model. 
There are many examples of this: garage door openers, car locks, and other device controllers, but the most 
important is Wi-Fi. These application require little bandwidth or power, and thus, do not make the spectrum 
scarce. Scarcity problems are mitigated by operator separation. In contrast, mobile phones require much 
greater power and bandwidth, creating spectrum scarcity, and hence an auction is needed to assign the scarce 
resource among the competing carriers. 
Spectrum auctions to date have been long-term auctions in which the winner is granted a license of from 
10 years to 25 years, with a strong expectation of renewal following expiration. One might think instead that a 
spot market for spectrum, much like a spot market for electricity, would be a more flexible and efficient 
instrument. Someday that will be true. But today’s hardware, especially the handset, is not sufficiently flexible 
to accommodate a real-time spot market. Moreover, carriers must make large specific investments in their 
networks. These long-term investments are better supported with a long-term license for spectrum, a critical 
input. Over the next twenty years increasingly flexible hardware will be introduced. Eventually it will make 
sense to organize the spectrum market much like the electricity market. The basic element will be a real-time 
spot market that establishes the price of bandwidth at a particular time and location. But for now, long-term 
spectrum auctions are both necessary and desirable. 
One of the greatest challenges for the regulator is keeping up with the rapid technological development 
of wireless communications. Indeed, one of the main reasons for switching from beauty contests, to lotteries, 
to auctions was that beauty contests and lotteries were too slow. Wireless communications plays an essential 
role  in  modern  economies,  both  in  developed  and  developing  countries.  Slowing  the  pace  of  wireless 
innovation and development has large costs to economic growth. For this reason, regulators must do whatever 
they can to promote a competitive wireless industry. Allocating sufficient spectrum in a timely manner is 
paramount.  
The  combinatorial  clock  auction  described  here  helps  facilitate  the  spectrum  allocation  process  by 
enabling the auction to determine how the spectrum is organized, which is called the band plan. Prior methods 
required that the regulator determine a fixed band plan before the auction began. As a result, before each 
auction there is a long regulatory process, much like the beauty contests of before, but with the companies 
lobbying for particular band plans, rather than for direct spectrum awards. This is the most time consuming 
and error prone element of the spectrum management process. Thus, the new approach promises to not only 
improve spectrum assignments, but to improve the band plans within which the assignments fit, and to do so 
with less delay. 
From  an  auction  theory  viewpoint,  spectrum  auctions  are  both  challenging  and  interesting.  The 
government  is  auctioning  many  items  that  are  heterogeneous  but  similar.  Often  there  are  competing 
technologies as well as companies to provide a wide range of communication services. As a result, the setting 
has a complex structure of substitutes and complements. This is among the most difficult auction settings seen 
in practice. 
The goal for the government should be efficiency, not revenue maximization. The government should 
focus on ensuring that those who can put the spectrum to its highest use get it. Focusing simply on revenue 
maximization is short-sighted. Many steps such as technical and service flexibility, and license aggregation and 
disaggregation, improve efficiency, and thereby improve revenues. But short-run revenue maximization by   3 
creating  monopolies,  which  would  create  the  highest  profits  before  spectrum  fees,  and  therefore  would 
sustain  the  largest  fees,  should  be  resisted.  Indeed,  competition,  which  ultimately  will  lead  to  greater 
innovation and better and cheaper services, will likely generate greater government revenues from a long-run 
perspective. The government can best accomplish this objective with an efficient auction, putting the spectrum 
to its best use. 
The  regulator  may  find  it  necessary  to  introduce  spectrum  caps  or  other  preferences  favoring  new 
entrants  so  as  to  level  the  playing  field  between  incumbents  and  new  entrants  (Cramton,  et  al.  2012). 
Incumbents  include  in  their  private  value,  the  benefit  of  foreclosing  competition,  thus  driving  a  wedge 
between social value and private value. In theory the regulator can correct this externality by favoring the new 
entrant, but in practice this has proven to be difficult. The FCC’s experience with preferences for certain 
bidders―set asides, bidding credits, and installment payments―has been disappointing at least with respect 
to mobile broadband communication, which is where most of the value lies. 
In contrast, a good example of successful intervention was Canada’s use of set asides in its 2008 Advanced 
Wireless Services or AWS auction. As a result, multiple deep-pocketed new entrants came to the auction, and 
bid up the price of not only the set-aside blocks, but the non-set-aside blocks. The result was a much more 
competitive auction (with much higher revenues) and the introduction of some potentially strong new service 
providers  going  forward.  The  approach  effectively  broke  up  regional  market-splitting  by  the  dominant 
incumbents. Another successful intervention was the FCC’s use of a spectrum cap in early broadband PCS 
auctions. The cap limited the quantity of spectrum any one carrier could hold in a geographic area, addressing 
the potential market failure of limited competition in the market for wireless services. 
Despite these successes in Canada and the US, the FCC’s long and sometimes troubled history with bidder 
preferences  is  an  important  case  study  to  other  countries  considering  preferences  for  various  parties. 
Installment payments proved especially problematic, as it led to speculative bidding, bankruptcy, and lengthy 
delay in the use of the spectrum. 
In  addition,  the  regulator  must  resist  the  temptation  to  force  more  “winners”  than  the  market  can 
efficiently support. Sometimes regulators fragment the spectrum and prohibit aggregation in the auction in an 
effort to create as many winners as possible. The India 3G spectrum auction may be one example. Aggregation 
up to a suitable competitive constraint is preferred. 
1.1  Three main points 
There are three main points I wish to emphasize. 
Enhance substitution. First in terms of the auction design, it is important to enhance the substitution 
across the items that are being sold. Enhanced substitution is accomplished through both the product design—
what is auctioned—and of the auction format. Often in the spectrum setting, the product design can be just as 
important as the auction design. 
Encourage  price  discovery.  Second,  encouraging  price  discovery  is  extremely  important.  We  need  a 
dynamic process, because unlike some situations, in the case of spectrum auctions, there is much uncertainty 
about what things are worth. The bidders need to do a lot of homework to develop a crude valuation model, 
and they need the benefit of some collective market insights, which can be revealed in a dynamic auction 
process, in order to improve their decision-making. The nice thing about a dynamic auction is that through this 
price process the bidders gradually have their sights focused on the most relevant part of the price space. 
Focusing bidder decisions on what is relevant is in my mind the biggest source of benefit from the dynamic 
process. This benefit is generally ignored by economists, because economists assume that the bidders fully 
understand  their  valuation  models,  when  in  practice  bidders  almost  never  have  a  completely  specified 
valuation model. Yes, they do a lot of homework, but there is still much uncertainty about what lots are worth, 
and how they should be valuing the spectrum. The experience of the 3G spectrum auctions in Europe is a good   4 
example. The bids were based more on stock prices in a bubble situation, rather than on solid analysis about 
values. 
Induce truthful bidding. The third feature I wish to emphasize is the importance of inducing truthful 
bidding. This is accomplished in the auction design through an effective pricing rule and an activity rule. The 
two rules work together to encourage bidders to truthfully express preferences throughout the entire auction. 
This truthful expression of preferences is what leads to excellent price discovery and ultimately an efficient 
auction outcome. 
A variety of different pricing rules are used in practice. The two most common are pay-as-bid pricing, 
where you pay what you bid if you are the winner, and for a homogenous product, uniform pricing, where you 
pay the market clearing price. In the particular applications I am discussing here, we generally do not have 
clearing prices, because of strong complementarities and heterogeneous items. As a result, we need a new 
kind of pricing rule. The pricing rule that I will describe in detail later is a generalization of Vickrey´s second-
price rule. 
I now give a brief overview of the combinatorial clock auction. The approach may appear complex. Some 
amount  of  complexity  is  required  given  the  complex  economic  problem.  Simpler  versions,  such  as  a 
simultaneous clock auction are possible in settings where all bidders intend to use the same technology. This 
may well be the case in developing countries that are conducting spectrum auctions for a particular use after 
the technology battles have been resolved from the experience in developed countries. 
1.2  An overview of the combinatorial clock auction 
The combinatorial clock auction is especially useful in situations where the regulator does not know which 
technology will make best use of the spectrum. In such cases, the auction itself can determine the ultimate 
band plan specifying how the spectrum is organized. Such an auction is said to be technology neutral, since it 
allows the competing technologies to determine the winning technologies, as well as carriers. A good example 
is  an  auction  that  accommodates  both  paired  and  unpaired  technologies,  such  as  LTE  and  WiMAX, 
respectively. A combinatorial auction is essential in this case, since the two uses require that the spectrum be 
organized  in  fundamentally  different  ways.  The  combinatorial  clock  auction  is  an  especially  simple,  yet 
powerful, auction that lets competitive bids determine the ultimate band plan. 
The combinatorial clock auction has features to address each of my three main points. 
First, the product design simplifies the products whenever possible. For example, if bidders primarily care 
about the quantity of spectrum won in a geographic area, we auction generic spectrum and the bidders bid for 
a  quantity  of  spectrum  in  each  area.  This  simplifies  the  auction,  enhances  substitution,  and  improves 
competition. The specific assignment of lots is determined in the last stage of the auction, once the critical 
decisions have been made (who won how much in each area). This approach also allows a technology neutral 
auction, which lets the spectrum be organized in different ways for the different technologies. Each bidder 
indicates the quantity of spectrum and the type of use in its bids. In this case, the first stage of the auction 
determines not only who won how much in each area, but the overall quantity of spectrum allocated for a 
particular use in the area. 
Second,  to  encourage  price  discovery,  the  auction  begins  with  a  clock  stage.  Prices  ascend  for  each 
product with excess demand until there is no excess demand for any product. This simple and familiar price 
discovery process works extremely well when bidders have incentives for truthful bidding. In the important 
case of substitutes, the clock stage determines an efficient assignment together with supporting competitive 
equilibrium  prices.  Moreover,  complements  are  handled  with  no  increase  in  the  complexity  of  the  clock 
process. Each bid in the clock stage is a package bid, so bidders can bid without fear of winning only some of 
what they need.   5 
Bidders may find that they are unable to express preferences for all desirable packages in the clock stage, 
so following the clock stage is a supplementary round. Bidders can increase their bids on packages bid in the 
clock stage and submit new bids on other packages. All the clock stage bids and the supplementary round bids 
then are run through an optimizer to determine the value maximizing assignment of the spectrum. This is the 
generic assignment. 
Third, to induce truthful bidding, the auction uses Vickrey-nearest-core pricing. The efficient assignment is 
priced to minimize the bidders' total payments subject to competitive constraints (no group of bidders has 
offered the seller more). In practice, this often implies Vickrey pricing, ensuring truthful bidding. However, 
because of complements, there may be one or more competitive constraints that cause the payments to be 
greater than Vickrey payments for some bidders. In this event, the smallest deviations from Vickrey prices are 
used. 
To induce truthful bidding throughout the clock stage, an activity rule based on revealed preference is 
used. This rule encourages bidders to bid in the straightforward manner of selecting the most profitable 
package in each round. Deviations from bidding on the most profitable package throughout the clock stage 
may impose a constraint on subsequent bids, either later in the clock stage or in the supplementary round. 
Once the generic assignments are determined and priced, the specific assignment stage is run. Each 
winner  submits  top-up  bids  for  each  specific  assignment  that  is  better  than  the  winner’s  worst  specific 
assignment.  The  bids  indicate  the  incremental  value  for  each  feasible  alternative.  Then  an  optimization 
program is run to determine the efficient specific assignment. Again the prices for the specific assignments are 
Vickrey-nearest-core prices. This concludes the auction. 
This paper builds on well-developed literatures in auction theory and practice, especially combinatorial 
auctions and spectrum auctions. Much of the literature on combinatorial auctions is summarized in Cramton et 
al. (2006). The work of Ausubel et al. (2006), Ausubel and Milgrom (2006a,b), Day and Raghavan (2007), Day 
and Milgrom (2008), Day and Cramton (2012), Milgrom (2007, 2009), Parkes (2006), and Porter et al. (2003) is 
especially relevant. On spectrum auctions see Coase (1959) for the original proposal, Ausubel et al. (1997) on 
synergies,  McMillan  (1994),  Cramton  (1995,  1997,  2006),  Klemperer  (2004),  and  Milgrom  (2004)  on  the 
performance  of  the  simultaneous  ascending  auctions,  and  Brusco  and  Lopomo  (2002)  and  Cramton  and 
Schwartz (2002) on collusion. Kagel et al. (2010) experimentally compare the simultaneous ascending auction 
with a particular ascending combinatorial auction, which differs significantly from the one presented here. 
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the 
combinatorial clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous 
ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the combinatorial clock auction: the pricing rule and 
the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the combinatorial clock 
auction. 
The combinatorial clock auction is of great practical interest. The design has been adopted for major 
spectrum auctions in many countries over three continents. 
2  Simultaneous ascending auction 
The workhorse for spectrum auctions since 1994 has been the simultaneous ascending auction, a simple 
generalization of the English auction to multiple items in which all items are auctioned simultaneously. Thus, 
unlike Sotheby’s or Christie’s auctions in which the items are auctioned in sequence, here all the items are 
auctioned at the same time. 
The process is as follows. Each item or lot has a price associated with it. Over a sequence of rounds, 
bidders are asked to raise the bid on any of the lots they find attractive, and the auctioneer identifies the 
provisional winner for each lot at the end of every round. The process continues until nobody is willing to bid 
any higher. This process was originally proposed by Preston McAfee, Paul Milgrom, and Robert Wilson for the   6 
FCC  spectrum  auctions.  Since  its  introduction  in  July  1994,  the  design  has  undergone  numerous 
enhancements, but the basic design has remained intact in its application worldwide for the vast majority of 
spectrum auctions. 
An important element of the basic design is an activity rule to address the problem of bid sniping—
waiting until the last minute to bid seriously. The rule adopted by the FCC and used in all simultaneous 
ascending auctions to date is a quantity-based rule. The rule requires a bidder wanting to be a big bidder at the 
end of the auction, to be a big bidder throughout the auction. Each bidder must maintain a level of activity, 
based on the quantity of spectrum the bidder is bidding for, in order to continue with that level of eligibility 
later on. Thus, a bidder cannot play a snake-in-the-grass strategy where the bidder holds back and waits, and 
then pounces late in the auction, thereby winning without making its true intent known until the last instant. 
As mentioned, the simultaneous ascending auction has been used for a long time. The FCC has conducted 
about 80 simultaneous ascending auctions, since it was introduced in July of 1994. The FCC has gotten good at 
conducting the auctions, and the design has worked reasonably well. Nonetheless, it is perhaps surprising how 
quickly inertia set in. The FCC was initially highly innovative in its initial choice of design, but since then the FCC 
has just made minor incremental improvements in response to obvious and sometimes severe problems with 
the original simultaneous ascending auction design. 
Why has the design held up so well? The simultaneous ascending auction is an effective and simple price 
discovery process. It allows arbitrage across substitutes. It lets bidders piece together desirable packages of 
items.  And,  because  of  the  dynamic  process,  it  reduces  the  winner’s  curse  by  revealing  common  value 
information during the auction (Kagel and Levin 1986, Kagel et al. 1996). 
But the design does, and has been observed to have, many weaknesses. 
  As a result of the pricing rule, there is a strong incentive for large bidders to engage in demand 
reduction―to reduce the quantity demanded before the bidder’s marginal value is reached in order 
to win at lower prices. 
  Especially if there is weak competition, bidders have an incentive to engage in tacit collusion. The 
bidders  employ  various  signaling  strategies  where  they  attempt  to  work  out  deals  through  the 
language of the bids. The goal of the strategies is to divvy-up the items among the bidders at low 
prices. 
  As a result of the activity rule, there are parking strategies. A bidder maintains eligibility by parking its 
eligibility in particular spots that the bidder is not interested in and then moves to its true interest 
later. 
  The simultaneous ascending auction is typically done without package bids. The bidders are bidding 
on individual lots and there is the possibility that a bidder will win some of the lots that it needs for its 
business plan, but not all. This exposure to winning less than what the bidder needs has adverse 
consequences on efficiency. Essentially the bidder has to guess. Either the bidder goes for it or not. 
When there are complementarities, this is a tough decision for the bidder to make. The bidder may 
make the wrong decision and win something it actually does not want or fail to win something it does 
want. 
  The lack of package bids also makes the simultaneous ascending auction vulnerable to hold up, which 
is basically a speculator stepping in and taking advantage of a bidder (Pagnozzi 2010). The speculator 
can make it clear to large bidders that it would be expensive to push him out of the way. As a result, 
the large bidders let the speculator win some desirable lots at low prices, and then the speculator 
turns around and sells them to the big players after the auction is over. That is the holdup strategy. It 
is easy to do and effective. Preventing resale would reduce this problem, but resale is desirable in a 
rapidly changing dynamic industry.   7 
  There is limited substitution across licenses, which is something I am going to emphasize. The reader 
might think that it would be easy to arbitrage across the lots, but in fact that is not the case. Especially 
in a large country like the United States, where the FCC splits up the frequency bands in different 
ways, geographically, and the bidders can only bid on individual lots, rather than packages. 
As a result of all these factors, the bidding strategies are quite complicated. 
2.1  The US AWS and 700 MHz auctions 
The difficulties in arbitraging across substitutes are best illustrated in the two most recent major auctions 
in the United States: AWS and 700 MHz. 
Figure 1.The US AWS band plan: something for everyone 
 
First the AWS, Advances Wireless Services, auction sold 90 MHz of spectrum in 161 rounds, and raised 14 
billion dollars. As in all of its auctions, the FCC began the process by settling on a specific band plan (the 
product design, as shown in Figure 1), which effectively determined how the available bandwidth in each 
location  was  going  to  be  split  up  into  lots.  Each  lot  is  a  particular  frequency  band  covering  a  particular 
geographic area. In the case of the AWS auction, the FCC decided that six frequency blocks of paired spectrum 
(A-F) were to be auctioned. Three blocks were 20 MHz and three were 10 MHz. Because the US is so large, 
each  frequency  block  was  also  partitioned  geographically.  And  because  the  FCC  was  attempting  to 
accommodate all types of bidders, the FCC partitioned the blocks in three different ways: for blocks D-F the 
country was split into 12 large regions; for blocks B and C the country was split into 176 medium-size regions; 
and for block A the country was split into 734 small regions. Remarkably, the different partitions do not form a 
hierarchy in the sense that a bidder cannot construct one of the medium-sized lots by aggregating a number of 
small lots. This inability to aggregate small into medium clearly limits substitution across blocks. 
The underlying substitution problem was caused both by the product design—the use of specific blocks 
following  three  different  geographic  schemes—and  the  auction  format.  Figure  2  illustrates  the  severe 
problems  bidders  had  substituting  across  blocks  in  the  AWS  auction.  It  shows  the  price  per  10  MHz  of 
spectrum for each of the blocks at the end of critical days in the auction. Recall there are six blocks, so there 
are six bars (A through F) at the end of each day. The 20 MHz bars are twice as wide as the 10 MHz bars so the 
area of the bar corresponds to revenues at the time indicated. Finally, different colors represent different 
bidders, so the reader can see who the provisional winners are at the various times in the auction. The two 
largest bidders are T-Mobile (turquoise) and Verizon (red). 
If there was perfect arbitrage across blocks, then the length of the bars would be the same at each time in 
the auction, indicating equal prices across blocks. Over time, the prices would move higher, but the prices 
would tend to move together across the blocks, as bidders would arbitrage to the cheaper lots per MHz of 
spectrum. 
What happened in the AWS auction is extremely far from that. Look at the end of day five. At this point, 
the F block has already reached its final price. The A block is less than one twentieth the price of the F block. If 
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the A block is roughly equivalent to the F block, why wouldn’t Verizon, say, switch to the much cheaper A 
block, instead of placing bids twenty times higher on the F block? The reason has to do with substitution 
difficulties. When Verizon is bumped off a large F block license, it is easy for Verizon to substitute down to the 
A block, submitting say the 100 or so bids on the A lots that roughly cover the corresponding F lot. The 
problem is that once shifting down it would be nearly impossible to shift back up to F. The reason is that in 
Figure 2.The absence of arbitrage across substitutes in the US AWS auction 
 
subsequent rounds Verizon would only be bumped from some of the corresponding A block lots. Verizon 
would have to withdraw from many A lots in order to return to F, exposing itself to large withdrawal penalties. 
In addition on block A, Verizon would be vulnerable to various hold-up strategies, where speculators could pick 
important holes in a synergistic aggregation of lots. 
Since substituting down from large (F,E,D) to small (C, B, A) lots is easier than substituting up, the auction 
essentially proceeded in a sequential fashion. First, the bidders competed for the large-lot blocks (F,E, D), then 
they competed for the medium-lot blocks (C and B), and finally the competition fell to the small-lot block (A). 
This explains the sequential, rather than simultaneous price process across blocks. See Bulow et al. (2009) for 
more on this auction. 
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Table 1.Band plan and final prices ($/MHz-pop) for paired spectrum in 700 MHz auction 
 
The next major auction in the US was the 700 MHz auction. The band plan for the paired spectrum is 
shown above. The FCC did the same thing in this auction. Specific blocks were auctioned, using three different 
partitions of the US. Again the different partitions did not form a hierarchy. The final prices per MHz-pop range 
from $0.76 for the C block to $2.68 for the B block, as shown in Table 1. These final prices differ by over a 
factor of three. We see again that the substitution across blocks is far from perfect. Interestingly, this time it is 
the small-lot block B that sold for a high price, and the large-lot block C that sold for a low price―just the 
opposite of what happened in the AWS auction. 
Although the C-block had an open access provision, requiring that the carrier not discriminate against 
either devices or applications, the terms of open access were sufficiently watered down that I doubt it had 
much of an impact on the C-block price. In my view, the price difference was because competing bidders 
thought  that  competing  on  the  C-block  against  Verizon  (or  perhaps  AT&T  and  Verizon)  was  sufficiently 
hopeless that it would be better to focus on the A and B blocks. See Cramton et al. (2007) for more on the 
competitive issues in this auction. 
The conclusion from the now long history of spectrum auctions using the simultaneous ascending auction 
is  that  it  works  reasonably  well  in  simple  situations  with  a  single  geographic  scheme.  However  in  more 
complex settings, the approach leads to complex bidding strategies that complicate the auction and may 
undermine the efficient assignment of spectrum. 
3  A better way: the combinatorial clock auction 
Fortunately, there is a better way. All that is needed is a number of complementary enhancements that 
ultimately simplify the bidding process, improve its efficiency, and greatly expand its power. 
First, much of the game playing, such as tacit collusion and other bid signaling, can be eliminated with a 
shift to anonymous bids. In a combinatorial clock auction the round-by-round revelation of information is 
limited to aggregate measures of competition. Limiting round reports to prices and excess demand for each 
product gives the bidders the information needed to form expectations about likely prices and in resolving 
common value uncertainty, yet such reports do not allow the signaling strategies that support tacit collusion. 
Moreover, the streamlined report simplifies bidder decision-making and keeps the bidders focused on what is 
most relevant, the relationship between prices and aggregate demand. 
In most instances, spectrum lots covering the same region in adjacent frequencies are nearly perfect 
substitutes. The bidder primarily cares about the quantity of spectrum in MHz it has in the region, rather than 
the exact frequency location. Moreover, to minimize interference problems and maximize data speeds bidders 
prefer contiguous spectrum within any region. In this setting, it makes sense in the initial stage to auction 
generic spectrum. The initial stage determines the quantity of contiguous spectrum won in each region. The 
spectrum is treated as if it were a homogenous good within each region. This is an enormous simplification of 
what is being sold. The idea is to treat each MHz of spectrum within a geographic region and a particular 
frequency band as perfect substitutes. The auction first resolves the main question of how much spectrum in 
each  region  each  winner  gets  and  at  what  price,  before  the  auction  turns  to  the  more  subtle  and  less 
important question of the exact frequencies. 
Of course, there are some auctions where the differences across frequencies are too great to allow this 
simplified treatment, for example because of major interference differences by frequency, as the result of 
incumbents  with  a  right  to  stay  in  the  particular  band.  In  such  cases,  the  specific  spectrum  lots  can  be 
Block A B C
Bandwidth 12 MHz 12 MHz 22 MHz
Type paired paired paired
Partition 176 734 12
Price $1.16 $2.68 $0.76  10 
auctioned  from  the  start,  but  in  most  cases,  it  is  desirable  to  auction  generic  spectrum  first  and  then 
determine the specific assignment in a second stage. 
The specific assignment stage is simplified, since it only involves winners of the generic stage. The number 
of specific assignments typically is limited to the number of ways that the winners can be ordered. Thus, if 
there are m winners there are m! different specific assignments. For example, an auction with four winners in 
a particular region would have 4! = 4×3×2 = 24 different possible specific assignments. Assuming separability 
across regions, each of the four bidders would only need to express preferences among at most 24 different 
specific assignments. This number is reduced further if we assume that the bidder only cares about its own 
specific assignment and not the location of the other winners, as is commonly the case. Then for example with 
four winners of equal size, each winner would only need to express three preferences: the incremental value 
from the bidder’s first, second, and third-best specific assignment compared with its fourth-best. 
The use of generic lots, wherever possible, simplifies the auction, enhances substitution, and improves 
price discovery. Despite these advantages the FCC has chosen in each of its roughly 80 auctions to sell specific 
lots.  This  is  a  common  mistake  in  auction  design.  Interestingly,  even  in  countries  that  recognized  the 
advantages of selling generic lots, such as the German 3G auction, the generic lots were auctioned using a 
method for specific lots; that is, in the German 3G auction, even though the lots were perfect substitutes, the 
bidders bid on specific lots. 
The  first  innovation  is  an  improved  product  design,  based  on  generic  spectrum  in  each  region, 
accommodating multiple types of use. 
Once generic lots are adopted the next innovation becomes easier to see―the adoption of simple and 
powerful techniques that are well-suited to auctioning many divisible goods. 
The  second  innovation  is  the  use  of  a  simultaneous  clock  auction.  This  is  a  simplification  of  the 
simultaneous ascending auction. Each product has its own clock indicating its current price. Because of generic 
lots, each product may consist of multiple lots. In each round, the bidder is asked to indicate for each product 
the quantity of lots desired at the current price. At the end of the round, the auctioneer adds up the individual 
bids  and  reports  the  demand  for  each  product.  The  price  is  then  increased  on  any  product  with  excess 
demand. This process is repeated until there is no excess demand for any product. 
The two critical differences between the clock auction and the simultaneous ascending auction are 1) the 
bidder only answers demand queries, stating the quantities desired at the announced prices, and 2) there is no 
need to determine provisionally winning bidders at the end of every round. 
The  third  innovation  is  more  subtle,  but  extremely  powerful.  One  can  interpret  the  demand  vector 
reported by each bidder in each round as a package bid. The bidder is saying, “At these prices, I want this 
package  of  lots.”  Taking  this  interpretation  seriously  yields  a  combinatorial  auction  (or  package  auction) 
without the need for any optimization. This allows bidders to express complementarities within a simple price 
discovery process. 
Larry Ausubel and I have been conducting exactly this sort of package auction since 2001 for electricity 
and gas products in France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Hungary, and the United States (Ausubel and 
Cramton 2004). Thus far, we have conducted over 70 high-stakes auctions with this format for assets worth 
over $10 billion. We also used the approach in a spectrum auction in Trinidad and Tobago in 2005. The 
approach has been highly successful. 
The clock auction may end with some products in excess supply, as a result of complementarities among 
lots. In addition, since the clock process follows a single price path and only includes a limited number of price 
points, it is desirable to allow the bidder to specify additional bids in a supplementary round following the 
clock stage. The purpose is to let the bidder express preferences for additional packages that were missed by 
the clock process. In addition, the bidder can improve its bids on packages already bid on in the clock stage.   11 
Once the clock bids and the supplementary bids are collected, an optimization is run to determine the 
value-maximizing  generic  assignment  and  prices.  This  two-step  process  of  a  clock  auction  followed  by 
supplementary bids, which I call a combinatorial clock auction, was proposed by Larry Ausubel, Paul Milgrom, 
and me for spectrum auctions at an FCC auction conference in 2003 (Ausubel et al. 2006). We proposed the 
same approach for spectrum auctions in the UK in 2006, as well as for airport takeoff and landing rights in 
2003. Meanwhile, Porter et al. (2003) demonstrate in the experimental lab the high efficiency of a closely 
related approach. 
Two critical elements of a successful combinatorial clock auction are the pricing rule and the activity rule. I 
will discuss both at length. These two important rules work together to ensure that the bids are an accurate 
expression of bidder preferences throughout the entire auction. The high efficiency of the combinatorial clock 
auction derives mainly from incentives for nearly truthful bidding. A pricing rule based on second pricing 
encourages  truthful  bidding;  whereas,  the  activity  rule  based  on  revealed  preference  ensures  that  these 
incentives for truthful bidding are felt throughout the clock stage. 
4  UK spectrum auctions 
The  need  for  a  technology  neutral  auction  is  commonplace  in  today’s  world  of  rapidly  developing 
communications  technologies  and  applications.  Although  the  regulator  can  typically  identify  the  viable 
candidate technologies based on early development, the regulator cannot decide how available spectrum 
should be split among the technologies without a market test. Examples are numerous, and several will be 
discussed here. 
Ofcom, the independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries, was 
the first to recognize and act on this need for a technology neutral auction. In spring 2006, Larry Ausubel and I 
proposed to Ofcom a version of the combinatorial clock auction. Since June 2006, I have been working with 
Ofcom in developing, testing, and implementing the design for a number of its auctions. Two such auctions, 
the 10-40 GHz auction and the L-band auction have occurred already. Both went well, and provided a useful 
field test for the economically much larger 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz auctions. Several countries in addition to the 
UK have since adopted the design for 4G auctions involving one or may spectrum bands. 
Ofcom has three main goals for the auction design. The auction should be technology neutral, allowing 
alternative  viable  technologies  to  compete  for  the  spectrum  on  an  equal  basis.  The  auction  should 
accommodate flexible spectrum usage rights, permitting the user to decide how the spectrum would be used, 
subject to minimizing interference externalities with neighbors. And the auction should promote an efficient 
assignment of the spectrum, putting the spectrum to its best use. 
Simplicity and transparency are important secondary objectives. On simplicity, Ofcom recognized that 
satisfying the main objectives posed serious challenges, which could not be addressed with an auction design 
that is too simple. Moreover, simplicity has to be assessed recognizing the complexity of bidder participation. 
For  example,  the  simultaneous  ascending  auction  has  simple  rules,  but  incredibly  complicated  bidding 
strategies. In contrast, the  combinatorial clock auction has more complex rules, but the rules have been 
carefully constructed to make participation especially easy. For the most part, the bidder can focus simply on 
determining its true preferences for packages it can realistically expect to win. In a combinatorial clock auction 
it is the auctioneer that needs to do the complex optimization, whereas the bidders can focus on their values 
for realistic packages. 
Revenue  maximization  was  explicitly  excluded  as  an  objective.  Nonetheless,  an  efficient  auction 
necessarily will generate substantial revenues. Indeed, my advice to countries is to focus on efficiency. A focus 
on revenues is short-sighted. In my view, the government is better off finding as much spectrum as possible 
and then auctioning it so as to put the spectrum to its best use. This approach creates a competitive and 
innovative market for communications, which has substantial positive spillovers to the rest of the economy.   12 
Under this approach, long-term revenues likely will far exceed those that would come from the maximization 
of short-term auction revenues. 
I now explain the details of two essential rules in the combinatorial clock auction: the pricing rule and the 
activity rule. The rules may appear complex, but the complexity actually simplifies the bidding strategies, 
making it easier for bidders to participate in the auction. 
5  Pricing rule: Vickrey-nearest-core pricing 
Prices are determined at two points in the auction, after the clock stage, including the supplementary 
bids, to determine the base prices for the winners in the value-maximizing generic assignment, and after the 
assignment stage to determine the additional payments for specific assignments. 
The pricing rule plays a major role in fostering incentives for truthful bidding. Pay-as-bid pricing in a clock 
auction or a simultaneous ascending auction creates incentives for demand reduction (Ausubel and Cramton 
2002). Large bidders shade their bids, recognizing their impact on price. This bid shading both complicates 
bidding strategies and also leads to inefficiency. 
In contrast, Vickrey pricing provides ideal incentives for truthful bidding. Each winner pays the social 
opportunity cost of its winnings, and therefore receives 100 percent of the incremental value created by its 
bids. This aligns the maximization of social value with the maximization of individual value for every bidder. 
Thus, with private values, it is a dominant strategy to bid truthfully. See Ausubel (2004, 2006) for an analysis in 
a clock auction. 
Unfortunately, as a result of complements, it may be that the Vickrey prices are too low in the sense that 
one or more bidders would be upset with the assignment and prices paid, claiming that they had offered the 
seller more. For example, suppose there are two items, A and B, and three bidders. Bidder 1 bids $4 for A, 
bidder 2 bids $4 for B, and bidder 3 bids $4 for A and B. The Vickrey outcome is for 1 to win A, 2 to win B, and 
each winner pays $0. Bidder 3 in this case has a legitimate complaint, “Why are you giving the goods to bidder 
1 and 2, when I am offering $4 for the pair?” The basic problem is that with complements, the Vickrey 
outcome may not be in the core. Some coalition of bidders may have offered the seller more than the sum of 
the Vickrey prices. (The core is defined as a set of payments that support the efficient assignment in the sense 
that there does not exist an alternative collation of bidders that has collectively offered the seller more.) This 
point has been emphasized in Ausubel and Milgrom (2002). 
The solution is to increase one or more prices to assure that the prices are in the core. In order to provide 
the best incentives consistent with core pricing, the auctioneer finds the lowest payments that are in the core; 
that is, such that no alternative coalition of bidders has offered the seller more than the winning coalition is 
paying. 
If we are auctioning a single item, then this is the second-price auction. Suppose the highest bidder bids 
$100 and the second-highest bidder bids $90. The item is awarded to the highest bidder, who pays the second-
highest price of $90―the social opportunity cost of awarding the good to the highest bidder. Alternatively, we 
can think of assigning the item to maximize value, so we assign it to the highest bidder, and then we find the 
smallest payment that satisfies the core constraints. In this case, the second-highest bidder would be upset if 
the highest bidder paid less than $90, so $90 is the bidder-optimal core price. When the items are substitutes, 
then the bidder-optimal core point is unique and identical to the Vickrey prices. 
The payment minimizing core prices, or bidder-optimal core prices, typically are not unique when the 
Vickrey prices are outside the core. Thus, it will be important to have a method of selecting a unique bidder-
optimal core point when there are many. One sensible approach adopted in each of the recent Ofcom auctions 
for both the base prices and the assignment prices is to select the payment minimizing core prices that are 
closest to the Vickrey prices. This is what I call Vickrey-nearest-core pricing. Since the set of core prices is 
convex―a polytope formed from the intersection of half-spaces―and the Vickrey prices are always unique,   13 
there is a unique vector of core prices that is closest in Euclidean distance to the Vickrey prices. Not only are 
the prices unique, but since they are bidder-optimal-core prices, they maximize the incentive for truthful 
bidding among all prices that satisfy core constraints (Day and Milgrom 2007). 
The approach then is to take all the bids from the clock stage and the supplementary bids, determine the 
value maximizing assignment, and then determine the payment minimizing core prices that are closest to the 
Vickrey prices. It is my experience that bidders are quite happy with this approach―they like the idea of 
minimizing payments, and they recognize the importance of making sure that the prices are sufficiently high 
that  no  coalition  of  bidders  has  offered  the  seller  more.  Prices  are  as  small  as  possible  subject  to  the 
competitive constraints. 
Calculating the winning assignments and prices involves solving a sequence of standard optimization 
problems. The basic problem is the winner determination problem, which is a well-understood set-packing 
problem. The main winner determination problem is to find the value maximizing assignment. To guarantee 
uniqueness, there is a sequence of lexicographic objectives, such as:1) maximize total value, 2) minimize 
concentration, 3) maximize quantity sold, and 4) random. First the auctioneer maximizes total value. Then a 
constraint that the value equals this maximum value is added and concentration is minimized. Then another 
constraint that concentration equals this minimum level is added and the quantity sold is maximized. Finally, 
the constraint that the quantity sold equals this maximum quantity is added and an objective based on random 
values for each bid is maximized. This guarantees uniqueness. 
Calculating the prices is a bit more involved. First, we determine the Vickrey prices by solving a sequence 
of winner determination problems, essentially removing one winner at a time to determine each winner’s 
social opportunity cost of winning its package. Then we determine the bidder-optimal core prices using a 
clever constraint generation method proposed in Day and Raghavan (2007). Having found the Vickrey prices, 
we solve another optimization to find the most violated core constraint. If there is none, then we are done, 
since the Vickrey prices are in the core. Otherwise, we add this most-violated constraint and resolve the 
optimization, again finding the most violated core constraint. We add it to the optimization and re-solve. We 
keep doing this until there is no violated core constraint, and then we are done. 
The reason that that Day-Raghavan approach is a highly efficient method of solution is because in practice 
there are typically only a handful of violated core constraints; thus, the procedure stops after just a few steps. 
In contrast the number of core constraints grows exponentially with the number of bidders and that makes 
including all the core constraints explicitly an inefficient method of solving the problem, both in time and 
memory. 
As  mentioned,  the  tie-breaking  rule  for  prices  is  important,  since  typically  ties  will  arise  along  the 
southwest face of the core polytope. Finding the prices that are closest to the Vickrey prices involves solving a 
simple quadratic optimization. This gives us a unique set of prices. Uniqueness is important. It means that 
there is no discretion in identifying the outcome, either in the assignment or the prices. 
An example will help illustrate all of these concepts. Suppose there are five bidders, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, bidding 
for two lots, A and B. The following bids are submitted: 
b1{A} = 28 
b2{B} = 20 
b3{AB} = 32 
b4{A} = 14 
b5{B} = 12 
Bidders 1 and 4 are interested in A, bidders 2 and 5 are interested in B, and bidder 3 is interested in the 
package A and B.   14 
Determining the value maximizing assignment is easy in this example. Bidder 1 gets A and bidder 2 gets B, 
generating 48 in total value. No other assignment yields as much. Vickrey prices are also easy to calculate. If 
we remove bidder 1, then the best assignment gives A to bidder 4 and B to bidder 2, resulting in 34, which is 
better than the alternative of awarding both A and B to bidder 3, which yields 32. Thus, the social opportunity 
cost of bidder 1 winning A is 34 – 20 = 14 (the value lost from bidder 4 in this case). Similarly, if we remove 
bidder 2, then the efficient assignment is for bidder 1 to get A and bidder 5 to get B, resulting in 40. Then the 
social opportunity cost of bidder 2 winning B is 40 – 28 = 12 (the value lost from bidder 5). Hence, the Vickrey 
outcome is for bidder 1 to pay 14 for A and for bidder 2 to pay 12 for B. Total revenues are 14 + 12 = 26. Notice 
that bidder 3 has cause for complaint, since bidder 3 offered 32 for both A and B. 
Now consider the core for this example. The core is represented in the payment space of the winning 
bidders―in this case the payments of bidders 1 and 2. Each bid defines a half-space of the payment space: 
  Bidder 1’s bid of 28 for A implies 1 cannot pay more than 28 for A. 
  Bidder 2’s bid of 20 for B implies 2 cannot pay more than 20 for B. 
  Bidder 3’s bid of 32 for AB implies that the sum of the payments for A and B must be at least 32. 
  Bidder 4’s bid of 14 for A implies that bidder 1 must pay at least 14 for A. 
  Bidder5’s bid of 12 for B implies that bidder 2 must pay at least 12 for B. 
The core is the intersection of these half-spaces as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.The Core 
 
This example is quite general. First, unlike in some economic settings, in an auction, the core is always 
nonempty.  The  reason  is  that  the  core  always  includes  the  efficient  outcome.  The  reason  is  that  all the 
constraints are southwest of the efficient point, since the efficient point maximizes total value. Second, the 
core  is  always  a  convex  polytope,  since  it  is  the  intersection  of  numerous  half-spaces.  Third, 
complementarities, like bidder 3’s bid for AB, are the source of the constraints that are neither vertical nor 
horizontal.  These  are  the  constraints  that  can  put  the  Vickrey  prices  outside  the  core.  Without 
complementarities, all the constraints will be vertical and horizontal lines, and there will be a unique extreme 















Efficient outcome  15 
Figure 4.Vickrey prices: how much can each winner’s bid be reduced holding others fixed? 
 
The graphical representation of the core is also a useful way to see the Vickrey prices. Vickrey is asking 
how much can each winner unilaterally reduce its bids and still remain a winner. As shown in Figure 4, bidder 1 
can reduce its bid to 14 before bidder 1 is displaced by bidder 4 as a winner. Similarly, bidder 2 can reduce its 
bid to 12 before being displaced by bidder 5. Thus, the Vickrey prices are 14 and 12. The problem is that these 
payments sum to 26, which violates the core constraint coming from bidder 3’s bid of 32 for AB. 
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optimal core prices 
are not unique!  16 
Bidder-optimal core prices can also be thought of as maximal reductions in the bids of winners, but rather 
than reducing the bids of each winner one at a time, we jointly reduce all the winning bids, as shown in Figure 
5, until the southwest face of the core is reached. As can be seen, this does not result in a unique core point, 
since the particular point on the southwest face depends on the rate at which each winner’s bids are reduced. 
The bidder-optimal core points consist of the entire southwest face of the core. If the southwest face is a 
unique point, then it is the Vickrey prices; if the southwest face is not unique then the face is a core constraint 
involving complementarities, and the Vickrey prices lie outside the core. 
Figure 6.Core point closest to Vickrey prices 
 
Nonetheless, there is always a unique bidder-optimal core point that is closest to the Vickrey prices. This 
is seen in Figure 6, as the bidder-optimal core point that forms a 90 degree angle with the line that passes 
through the Vickrey prices. This point minimizes the Euclidean distance from the Vickrey prices. 
Vickrey-nearest-core pricing was adopted in each of the UK spectrum auctions and has been adopted in 
several other auctions. Erdil and Klemperer (2010) argue that marginal incentives for truthful bidding may be 
improved by using a reference point other than the Vickrey prices for selecting among bidder-optimal core 
prices. In particular, they recommend a reference point that is independent of the winners’ bids. See also 
Ausubel and Baranov (2010) for additional analysis. 
Bidder-optimal core pricing has several advantages. First, it minimizes the bidders’ incentive to distort 
bids in a Pareto sense: there is no other pricing rule that provides strictly better incentives for truthful bidding. 
Bidder-optimal core pricing implies Vickrey pricing, whenever Vickrey is in the core. For example, when lots are 
substitutes, Vickrey is in the core, and the bidders have an incentive to bid truthfully. Since the prices are in the 
core, it avoids the problem of Vickrey prices being too low as a result of complements. 
6  Activity rule: revealed preference 
Good price discovery is essential in realizing the benefits of a dynamic auction. Good price discovery 
stems from providing incentives for the bidders to make truthful bids throughout the auction process. The 
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what we see on eBay every day: bid sniping—jumping in at the last instance in an auction and thereby holding 
information back. Absent an activity rule, bidders will have an incentive to hold back to conceal information. 
The activity rule is intended to promote truthful bidding throughout the auction process. 
Nearly all high-stake auctions, such as the FCC spectrum auctions, have an activity rule. The FCC uses a 
quantity-based rule. This rule has worked reasonably well in the FCC’s simultaneous ascending auctions, but in 
a combinatorial clock auction with Vickrey-nearest-core pricing, we need a more complex rule, one that is 
based on revealed preference (Ausubel et al. 2006). Such a rule is effective at getting bidders to bid in a 
straight-forward way throughout the clock stage, selecting the most profitable package given the current 
prices. 
The  traditional  activity  rule  in  both  simultaneous  ascending  auctions  and  clock  auctions  has  been  a 
quantity-based  rule:  to  be  a  large  winner  at  the  end  of  the  auction,  the  bidder  must  be  a  large  bidder 
throughout the auction. In particular, each lot corresponds to a particular quantity of spectrum, measured in 
either MHz-pop (the bandwidth times the population) or in eligibility points. The bidder starts with an initial 
eligibility based on the bidder’s initial deposit. To maintain this level of eligibility in future rounds, the bidder 
needs to bid on a sufficiently large quantity of spectrum in the current round, where “sufficiently large” is 
stated as some percentage, typically between 80% and 100% of the bidder’s current eligibility. If the bidder 
bids on a smaller quantity, the bidder’s eligibility is reduced in future rounds. This quantity-based rule has 
worked reasonably well, although as mentioned, it does create an incentive for parking eligibility on lots that a 
bidder is not truly interested in, especially if the eligibility points are not a good measure of relative value 
across lots. (The FCC’s MHz-pop measure is especially poor with small lots. Spectrum in New York City is much 
scarcer than spectrum in Montana. As a result, spectrum values are much higher in New York City on a per 
MHz-pop basis. Despite this fact, demonstrated in many dozens of spectrum auctions, the FCC still continues 
to use MHz-pop as the quantity measure in its auctions, exacerbating parking and other problems associated 
with the activity rule.) 
In many clock auctions, an activity requirement of 100% is used, which means that the bidder cannot 
increase the size of the package, as measured in eligibility points, as prices rise. For the case of a single 
product, this means that the bidder must bid in a manner consistent with a downward-sloping demand curve. 
In a combinatorial clock auction, one can use this quantity-based rule in the clock stage, but one also 
needs to specify how the rule limits bids in the supplementary round. This linkage between the clock bids and 
the supplementary bids is of critical importance, for otherwise the bidder could bid snipe, submitting all of its 
bids in the supplementary round. 
Ofcom proposed the following, which I call the eligibility point rule. During the clock stage, the bidder 
cannot increase the package size. Moreover, whenever the bidder reduces the package size, the bid on all 
larger packages is capped by the prices at the time of the reduction. For example, if during the clock stage a 
bidder  drops  from  a  package  of  size  10  to  6  at  prices  p,  then  for  all  packages  q  of  size  7  to  10,  the 
supplementary bid cannot be more than p · q. 
The eligibility point rule, which Ofcom used in its first two combinatorial clock auctions, has the advantage 
of simplicity. For each package there is at most a single linear constraint on the supplementary bid. However, it 
has a potentially serious problem. The straightforward strategy of bidding on the most profitable package in 
the clock stage is a poor strategy. A bidder following such a strategy would find that its supplementary bids 
would be sharply constrained, well below true values. To avoid this problem, the bidder must instead bid in 
the  clock  stage  to  maximize  package  size,  subject  to  a  nonnegative  profit  constraint.  That  is,  the  bidder 
throughout the clock stage bids on the largest package that is still profitable. 
Larry Ausubel, Paul Milgrom, and I proposed an alternative activity rule based on revealed preference for 
the combinatorial clock auction (Ausubel et al. 2006). Revealed preference is the underlying motivation for all 
activity rules. The intent is to require the bidder to bid in a way throughout the auction that is consistent with 
the bidder’s true preferences. Since we do not know the bidder’s true preferences, the best we can hope for is   18 
for the bidder to bid in a manner that is consistent with its revealed preferences. In the simplest case of a 
single-product clock auction, this is equivalent to monotonicity in quantity, just like the eligibility point rule, 
but when we have multiple products the two rules differ in important ways. 
For the combinatorial clock auction, the revealed preference rule is as follows. (See Harsha et al. 2009 for 
a stronger statement.) During the clock stage, a bidder can only shift to packages that have become relatively 
cheaper; that is, at time t´ >t, package qt´ has become relatively cheaper than qt: 
(P)  ( ) ( ). t t t t t t q p p q p p          
Moreover, every supplementary bid b(q) must be less profitable than the revised package bid b(qt) at t: 
(S)    
Each clock bid for package  , as improved in the supplementary round, imposes a cap on the supplementary 
bid for package q. 
An important advantage of the revealed preference rule is that a bidder following the straightforward 
strategy of bidding on its most profitable package in the clock stage would retain the flexibility to bid its full 
value on all packages in the supplementary round. 
To illustrate the implications of the two activity rules, consider the following example with two bidders 
and two identical lots (one product) in a setting of substitutes. The bidders’ preferences are given in Table 2, 
indicating the marginal and average value for 1 lot and 2 lots. 
Table 2. An example with two bidders and two identical lots 
 
Since the lots are substitutes, both bidders want to bid their true values in the supplementary round. 
However, consider what happens in the clock stage in response to the two different rules. 
With the revealed preference rule, each bidder has an incentive to bid on its most profitable package in 
each round. Thus, the bidding simply moves up each bidder’s marginal value (demand) curve. When the clock 
price reaches 2, both bidders drop from a package of size 2 to 1, and excess demand drops to zero. The clock 
stage ends at the competitive equilibrium price of 2 and the efficient assignment. Indeed, there is no need for 
any supplementary bids in this case. Bidder A can enter supplementary bids of 16 and 18, and bidder B can 
enter supplementary bids of 8 and 10, but these supplementary bids will not change the outcome in any way. 
Each bidder wins one lot and pays 2 (the Vickrey price). The supplementary round is unnecessary. The clock 
stage, by revealing the bidders marginal value information, up to the point of no excess demand, has revealed 
all that is needed to determine and price the efficient assignment. This is a general result with substitutes. 
With the eligibility point rule, bidders are forced to distort their bidding away from the straightforward 
strategy of profit maximization. In order to preserve the ability to bid full values in the supplementary round, 
the bidders instead bid on the largest package that is still profitable. This entails moving up the average value 
curve, since when the average value is exceeded a package is no longer profitable. Thus, when the clock price 
reaches 5, bidder B’s average value for 2 is reached and the bidder drops its demand to 1. Then when the clock 
price reaches 8, bidder B’s average value for 1 is reached and bidder B drops out. At this point there is no 
excess demand, so the clock stage ends with bidder A demanding 2, bidder B demanding zero, and the clock 
price  at  8.  In  the  supplementary  bid  round,  the  bidders  again  submit  their  true  preferences,  and  the 
optimization determines that each bidder should win one lot and should pay 2. The supplementary round was 
required to determine the efficient assignment and price the goods. Notice that the clock stage did little but 
mislead the bidders into thinking that bidder A would win all the items at a high price. 










1 lot 16 8 16 8
2 lots 2 2 9 5
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The reader might think that I somehow rigged this example to make the eligibility point rule look bad. This 
is not the case. Whenever lots are substitutes, the same features will be observed. With revealed preference, 
the clock stage will converge to the competitive equilibrium, revealing the efficient outcome and supporting 
prices; whereas with the eligibility point rule, the clock stage ends with an assignment that is excessively 
concentrated and prices that are too high. This result follows from the simple fact that average value exceeds 
marginal value, whenever aggregate demand is downward sloping, as shown in Figure 7. Having participated in 
many dozens of major spectrum auctions, I can confirm that this is indeed the typical case. 
Figure 7.Downward sloping aggregate demand implies average value > marginal value 
 
What is essential for price discovery is the revelation of the marginal value information. This helps bidders 
make the marginal tradeoffs that are of greatest relevance in figuring out what the outcome should be. This is 
why I believe the eligibility point rule is a poor choice. 
To further test the two activity rules, I conducted numerous simulations using realistic demand scenarios 
with significant complementarities from both technological and minimum scale constraints. I assumed that the 
bidders bid on the most profitable package with revealed preference (max profit) and bid on the largest 
profitable package with the eligibility point rule (max size). The results are summarized in Figure 8. Notice how 









Revealed preference price =
Competitive equilibrium price  20 
Figure 8.Revealed preference rule yields higher efficiency and fewer bids in the clock stage 
 
As a final test of the two activity rules, as well as other elements of the auction design, I conducted a 
series of full-scale tests in the experimental lab. For the tests, the Ofcom auction platform was used and 
indeed Ofcom staff served as the auctioneer. The subjects in the test were PhD students, who had taken an 
advanced course in game theory and auction theory, and had prior participation in combinatorial clock auction 
experiments. I chose such an experienced and expert subject pool, since in the actual spectrum auctions 
bidders often hire experts and devote substantial time and money to understand the strategic implications of 
the rules. 
Each subject participated in several auctions over a two-week period. In each auction, the subject was 
given  a  bidding  tool,  which  calculated  the  subject’s  value  for  each  package  consistent  with  the  bidder’s 
business plan. The scenarios as represented by the various bidding tools were chosen to be realistic. The 
valuation  models  included  both  substitutes  and  complements.  Complements  came  from  minimum  scale 
constraints as well as technological requirements. A training session was held before the auctions to explain 
the  details  of  the  combinatorial  clock  auction,  including  the  two  different  activity  rules.  All  subjects 
participated in both activity rule treatments. Each subject was paid an amount based on her experimental 
profits. The average subject payment was $420. 
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The experiments confirmed that the eligibility point rule caused a major deviation from straightforward 
bidding in the clock stage. Bidders quickly realized the need to bid on the largest profitable package. This 
undermined  price  discovery,  but  given  the  private  value  setting  and  simple  valuation  models,  the  poor 
performance of the clock stage was largely corrected by the supplementary bids and the optimization that 
followed.  There  were  some  instances  of  inefficiency  when  bidders  deviated  from  bidding  on  the  largest 
profitable package and then found they were unable to bid full values in the supplementary stage. 
In  contrast,  with  the  revealed  preference  rule,  bidders  almost  always  followed  the  straightforward 
strategy of bidding on the most profitable package. In the supplementary round, bidders typically bid full value 
and were not constrained by the revealed preference rule. As a result, efficiency was nearly 100%. More 
recently, Bichler, et al. (2011) conducted experimental tests of the combinatorial clock auction that achieved 
lower levels of efficiency (between 89 and 96 percent), because bidders tended to submit too few bids. For the 
combinatorial  clock  auction  to  perform  well,  it  is  important  for  bidders  to  submit  all  relevant  bids.  The 
experiments that I conducted did not suffer from “too few bids” because the bidders had a bidding tool that 
made it easy for them to submit bids on all the relevant packages. In my experience with real bidders, the 
bidders have had such tools and indeed the development of such tools is a big task in the preparations for the 
auctions.  
One issue that was discovered in the lab was the complexity of the revealed preference rule. The few 
bidders who deviated from bidding on the most profitable package in each round of the clock stage found they 
were unable to bid full value in the supplementary round as a result of the revealed preference constraint. 
These bidders had to make adjustments to bids to satisfy the revealed preference constraints, but it was 
difficult for them to figure out what changes to make. The challenge for the bidder is to figure out how best to 
adjust numerous bids in order to simultaneously satisfy many constraints (one per round). Even the brightest 
PhD students found this to be a daunting task without some computational help. 
One solution to the complexity problem is for the auction system to provide the bidder with some help. 
For  example,  the  bidder could  provide  the  system  with  its  desired  bids.  The  auction  system  then  would 
indicate  a  summary  of  the  bids  that  currently  violate  revealed  preference  constraints  and  suggest  an 
alternative set of bids that satisfies all constraints and is closest (in Euclidean distance) to the desired bids. This 
is exactly the information the subjects in the lab were looking for in the few instances of deviations from 
straightforward bidding. In the lab, the deviations were minor and the bids would have been easily adjusted 
with the help of smart auction system. 
In addition to complexity, the revealed preference rule may at times be too strong. Bidders’ values may 
change over the course of the auction for example as the result of common value uncertainty, or the bidder 
may have budget constraints. Thus, there are good reasons to simplify and somewhat weaken the revealed 
preference rule. 
The approach proposed for some the 4G auctions in several countries, such as the UK, Canada, and 
Australia, uses a revealed preference rule that only imposes a subset of the revealed preference constraints. 
Importantly in some of the designs all bids in the supplementary round must satisfy revealed preference with 
respect to the final clock round—this is known as the final price cap. Ausubel and Cramton (2011) provide 
further details. 
The  idea  behind  the  rule  is  that  it  may  be  unnecessary  to  include  all  of  the  revealed  preference 
constraints to get the bidders to adopt straightforward bidding. Since the incentive for bid sniping is not too 
strong,  even  the  possibility  of  a  revealed-preference  constraint  may  be  sufficient  to  induce  the  desired 
behavior. People put coins in parking meters in order to avoid the possibility of a parking ticket. We can hope 
that a simplified revealed preference rule will have the same effect in the combinatorial clock auction. 
Specifically, all supplementary bids b(q) are capped by the revealed preference constraint with respect to the 
final clock package qf:   22 
(S’)    
One of the desirable features of the final price cap (S’) is that the final package in the clock stage plays an 
especially  important  role in  limiting  bids.  Thus,  any  distortion  from  profit  maximization  in  the  final  clock 
package is especially costly to the bidder. Of course, the bidder never knows which clock round will be the last, 
so there is always some incentive to bid consistent with profit maximization. Moreover, as excess demand 
falls, the probability that the current round will be the last tends to increase, strengthening the incentive for 
straightforward bidding throughout the clock stage. 
A second desirable feature of the simplified revealed preference rule is that it makes the final clock 
assignment and prices much more meaningful, limiting the impact of the supplementary round and motivating 
aggressive bidding in the clock stage. 
Proposition 1.If the clock stage ends with no excess supply, then the final assignment is the same as the 
clock assignment. The supplementary round cannot alter the clock assignment. 
Proof. (S) implies that the marginal value of awarding qf to the bidder rather than q is at least the value of 
the lots at prices pf: 
 
It follows that any change in the final assignment cannot result in a higher total value. 
Proposition 2.If the clock stage ends with excess supply, then a winner can guarantee that it wins its clock 
assignment by raising its bid on its clock package by the value of the unsold lots at the final clock prices. 
Proof.(S) implies that the marginal value of awarding qf to the bidder rather than q is at least the value of 
the lots at prices pf: 
 
It follows that any change in the final assignment can result in a marginal value of at most   where 
qu is the vector of unsold lots in the clock assignment. Thus if a winner increases its bid on qf by the amount 
the final assignment must award the bidder qf. 
The propositions demonstrate that the clock stage provides excellent price and assignment discovery 
whenever the final clock assignment has little or no excess supply. Clock winners know how to guarantee their 
clock assignment. It is not necessary to increase bids to full value. A clock winner only needs to raise its bid on 
the final clock package by the value of the unsold lots at the final clock prices. Potential clock losers have an 
incentive to bid until no profitable packages remain, since losing in the clock stage may prevent winning any 
package. 
One unintended consequence of the final price cap (S’) is that it may destroy bidding incentives in the 
supplementary round. As a result of second pricing,  the bids in this round are still needed to determine 
competitive prices, but if there is certainty that each bidder will win its final clock package and that a bidder’s 
bids will not impact its prices but only the prices of others, this opens the door for strategic bidding in the 
supplementary round, for example to increase the prices paid by others. This problem is averted by not 
reporting  demand  information  after  the  final  clock  round.  Then  each  bidder  still  has  uncertainty  about 
whether it will win its final clock package. Bidding other than true values in the supplementary round may 
cause the bidder to win something other than its preferred package. 
In the case of substitutes, the clock stage performs perfectly, assuming a continuous clock. The pricing 
and  activity  rules  provide  incentives  for  straightforward  bidding.  The  clock  stage  yields  a  competitive 
equilibrium with an efficient assignment and supporting prices. Supplementary bids are not needed to improve 
the assignment. The final assignment is the same as the clock assignment. The optimization simply reduces 
prices to reflect opportunity costs. 
( ) ( ) ( ) . f f f b q b q q q p    
( ) ( ) ( ) .     f f f b q b q q q p
( ) ( ) ( ) .     f f f b q b q q q p
, uf qp 
, uf qp   23 
In the general case, the incentives for straightforward bidding are strong, but not perfect. Complements 
may push the Vickrey prices outside of the core, creating a threshold problem for some bidders. Nonetheless, 
if the clock stage ends without excess supply, then the final assignment is the clock assignment. Supplement-
ary bids may affect prices, but not the assignment. If there is excess supply at the end of the clock stage, the 
winners can guarantee winning at least the clock assignment with a limited raise. 
7  Conclusion 
The combinatorial clock auction is a large advance over the simultaneous ascending auction. It eliminates 
the  exposure  problem,  it  eliminates  most  gaming  behavior,  it  enhances  substitution,  and  it  encourages 
competition. The combinatorial clock auction enables a technology neutral auction. This should be especially 
valuable in settings where the regulator does not know in advance how the spectrum should be organized. The 
auction, through the competitive bids, determines how the spectrum is organized, rather than the regulator. In 
an environment where the regulator has little information about what technology or use is best, letting the 
auction resolve such matters can greatly expand the realized value of the scarce spectrum resource. 
A further advantage of the combinatorial clock auction is that it is readily customized for a variety of 
settings. Typically, a communications regulator will have a sequence of auctions over many years, as new 
spectrum  gradually  is  made  available.  The  combinatorial  clock  auction  can  be  adapted  to  the  unique 
characteristics  of  any  particular  auction.  Adopting  a  consistent  and  flexible  auction  platform  reduces 
transaction costs for the government and, more importantly, the bidders. 
The auction design also enhances competition. The process is highly transparent and encourages price 
discovery. There is enhanced substitution both through the product design and the auction format. Bidder 
participation costs are reduced. 
As in any market design problem, an important task for the regulator is to identify and mitigate potential 
market failures. In this setting and many others, the most important potential failure is market power. This is 
especially an issue in settings where there already is a highly concentrated communications market. Spectrum 
is an essential input for any new entrant. The approach here allows the regulator to address this potential 
market failure, as well as others, with a variety of instruments, such as spectrum caps, set asides, or bidding 
credits. The instruments must be used with care, or else they may do more harm than good. 
One of the greatest harms is delaying the allocation and award of spectrum. Avoiding economic loss from 
delay should be a main priority of the regulator. Incumbents often will argue that spectrum awards should be 
put off. Such arguments may simply be a far less costly means of impeding competition than outbidding an 
entrant in an auction. 
Fortunately, the use of a state-of-the-art auction design, such as the combinatorial clock auction and its 
variants,  does  not  cause  delay.  These  auctions  can  be  designed  and  implemented,  even  by  developing 
countries,  in  short  order,  provided  the  country  is  using  successful  techniques  adopted  elsewhere.  The 
bottleneck is regulatory procedures, not auction design and implementation. Providers of auction services can 
readily meet deadlines of a few months if necessary. 
The combinatorial clock auction can be applied in many other industries. For example, the approach was 
proposed and tested for the auctioning of takeoff and landing slots at New York City’s airports. The approach is 
well-suited for any setting in which there are many interrelated items, some of which are substitutes and some 
of which are complements. 
More broadly, the approach described here is an example of using auction design to harness the power of 
markets. The approach leads to improved pricing of a scarce resource, improving decision making, both short 
term and long term. Innovation is fostered from the better pricing and assignment of the scarce resource.   24 
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